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Abstract Established environmental policy theory is based on the assumption of homo
economicus. This means that people are seen as fully rational and acting in a self-regarding
manner. In line with this, economics emphasizes efficient policy solutions and the associ-
ated advantages of price incentives. Behavioral economics offers alternative, more realistic
views on individual behavior. In this paper we investigate opportunities to integrate bounded
rationality and other-regarding preferences into environmental policy theory to arrive at
recommendations for more effective policies. For this purpose, we will address decisions
made under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, decision heuristics, other-regarding
preferences, heterogeneity, evolutionary selection of behaviors, and the role of happiness.
Three aspects of environmental policy are considered in detail, namely sustainable con-
sumption, environmental valuation and policy design. We pay special attention to the role of
non-pecuniary, informative instruments and illustrate the implications for climate policy.
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1 Introduction
A good understanding of individual behavior and decision-making is essential to explain and
predict how people will act concerning environmental issues and subject to specific envi-
ronmental policies. Although behavioral economics enjoys increasing support, systematic
application of its theories and insights to economic sub-disciplines like environmental eco-
nomics is still very limited and has not resulted in a systematic set of policy recommendations.
This paper sets out to offer a summary of findings on human behavior and their implications
for environmental policy.
Economics traditionally uses a model of behavior commonly referred to as homo eco-
nomicus to analyze the economic behavior of individuals when subject to public policy.
This economic being is endowed with given preferences, perfect rationality and self-interest.
Human action is reduced to an optimization problem: behavior can be fully explained by
individuals maximizing their utility. This approach assumes that preferences are fixed and
that behavior is influenced only by prices and income. In line with this, economic analysis
proposes that generally a proper, socially desirable allocation of private and public goods is
achieved where prices direct economic decisions. Policy advice drawing on standard theory
suggests the use of monetary incentives to influence behavior. A clear example is environmen-
tal policy theory, developed by Baumol and Oates (1975), where price corrections capture
negative environmental externalities.
Behavioral economics offers an alternative explanation of human action based on rec-
ognizing bounded rationality and limited self-interest. Economic psychology has provided
a great amount of evidence against the neoclassical-economic model of individual behav-
ior and, in response, a range of alternative theories of behavior and models of choice have
been developed. Some influential studies are Simon (1955), Kahneman and Tversky (1974),
Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1980), Andreoni (1990), Rabin (1993) and Fehr
and Schmidt (1999). Behavior not complying with the standard model can be categorized as
“bounded or limited rationality” when decisions are constrained by cognitive processes and
available information, and as “other-regarding behavior” when motives like fairness, reci-
procity, and self-identity affect decisions. There are several good reviews now summarizing
findings from behavioral economics (Kahneman et al. 1986; Camerer 1995; Conlisk 1996;
Rabin 1998; McFadden 1999; Camerer et al. 2004; Lorenzoni et al. 2007; Meier 2007). A few
articles have addressed the application of behavioral theories to environmental economics
focusing on particular instances (van den Bergh et al. 2000; Shogren 2002; Shogren and
Taylor 2008; Venkatachalam 2008; Gowdy 2008; Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008).
The aim of the current paper is to reflect on the main alternative assumptions of behav-
ioral economics so as to be able to offer a more realistic account of effective and efficient
environmental policy. Designing adequate policies and incentives requires a good under-
standing of how people behave and make decisions within different contexts. Insight into
behavioral failures and motives other than self-interest can lead to adjustments of traditional
advice on policy design. This involves assessing responsiveness to policy incentives and
interventions, drivers of consumer choice, and non-economic factors affecting individual
decision-making.
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The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a brief overview of
behavioral economics and responses to it. This involves a classification of behavioral fail-
ures and motives violating rationality and other preference assumptions, notably regarding
social context. Section 3 discusses several other ideas that extend, or may be combined with,
the behavioral economics approach, namely preference heterogeneity, decisions by groups
and organizations, a non-representative agent approach, population models in evolutionary
economics, and insights from research on happiness or subjective well-being. Section 4
reviews applications of behavioral economics to environmentally relevant behavior, focus-
ing on environmental valuation and sustainable consumption. Section 5 discusses lessons for
environmental policy under bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences, paying par-
ticular attention to non-pecuniary incentives and the topical issue of climate policy. Finally,
Section 6 concludes while Section 7 discusses potential research avenues.
2 An Overview of Bounded Rationality and Other-Regarding Preferences
Behavioral economics strives to integrate the psychological foundations of human behav-
ior into economic analysis. It relies on evidence generated mainly by laboratory and, to a
lesser extent, natural or field experiments. These generally find that individuals systemati-
cally deviate from rational decision-making. This involves two main insights. Firstly, people
do not make optimal decisions, as they are boundedly rational due to cognitive limits, lack of
information and limited willpower. For instance, people regularly use decision heuristics—
so-called rules of thumb or decision shortcuts. Secondly, people have limited self-interest, i.e.
they are also driven by other-regarding preferences like fairness or reciprocity when making
decisions. Many examples of such behavior exist in the context of consumption activities:
heuristics and mental accounts influence product choice (Cheema and Soman 2006), pro-
social behavior affects donations or volunteering (Meier and Stutzer 2008), and status and
habits drive consumption (Lindbeck 1997). Behavioral economists have opened the way to
alternative models of behavior which adjust or replace the rational, maximization model and
its predictions, such as prospect theory, hyperbolic discounting, heuristics, habitual behavior,
status seeking, self-identity concerns, and theories involving social preferences.
As one might expect, there is also criticism of behavioral economics. This stresses two
lines of reasoning to justify the relevance of rational agents: market selection (evolution) and
learning (summarized by Mullainathan and Thaler 2000). Several economists have argued
that behavioral failures do not matter in the market as they are eliminated or mitigated by
mechanisms like arbitrage and competition. By contrast, behavioral economists claim that
there are limits to arbitrage. This has been repeatedly shown in research on financial markets
where individuals are found to regularly deviate from behavior as predicted by expected
utility theory. Financial theory has, in fact, moved in the direction of behavioral models in
response to the bounded rationality of investors (Levy et al. 2000; Shleifer 1999).
Another line of criticism states that the presence of evolutionary mechanisms supports
the irrelevance of behavioral anomalies. However, evolution is consistent with bounds on
rationality and should not be simplified as leading to optimal behavior. Alchian (1950),
who argued that firms that are profit seekers and those successful in achieving profits will
be selected by the market mechanism and survive. Friedman (1953) even went further and
proposed that profit “maximization” rather than “seeking” is selected by the market, thus
trying to find support for the idea that profit maximization, although not universal, will
be the sure outcome of selection by the market. Winter (1964) criticized both previous
authors, arguing that the explanation lacks a transmission mechanism for successful behavior.
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As a result, winning in one period is unrelated to winning in another period. If profit seeking
or maximizing is not deliberate or conscious, then it cannot be passed on to, or learned by,
others (Hodgson 1988: p. 78). This means winning remains a largely random process, as
shown by the profits of many firms fluctuating erratically over time. Moreover, even if the
Alchian-Friedman argument was correct, it would only pertain to profit, not utility maxi-
mization. In other words, the rational consumer behavior model would have to be saved by
a different type of argument. Another, more recent criticism on the foregoing evolutionary
argument in favor of rationality comes from behavioral economists who claim that there are
limits to arbitrage. This has been repeatedly shown in research on financial markets where
individuals are found to regularly deviate from behavior as predicted by expected utility
theory. Financial theory has, in fact, moved in the direction of behavioral models in response
to the bounded rationality of investors (Levy et al. 2000; Shleifer 1999).
A second defense of rational choice theory is as follows. Individuals who systematically
make mistakes might learn to overcome them. However, instead of costly investment in
increasing knowledge, learning often takes the form of low-cost, social learning through
imitation of frequent behavior or superficial features of successful behavior without under-
standing the nature of such success (Boyd and Richerson 1993). This comes down to agents
copying the behavior of other boundedly rational agents, which does not lead to rational
behavior.
Behavioral economics relies strongly on evidence generated by experiments. These have,
however, been criticized for lacking external validity, meaning that behavior assessed in
experiments might not correlate with, or resemble, real-world behavior. Empirical evidence
and observations outside the experimental laboratory can overcome problems with external
validity. Already Simon (1986, 209) acknowledged that behavioral economics requires “[…]
an empirically founded theory of choice that specifies what information decision makers use
and how they actually process it. This behavioral empirical base […] is essential for enhanc-
ing the explanatory and predictive power of economics”. In response, attention has shifted
somewhat to field and large-scale social experiments. These provide empirical evidence on
the relationship between laboratory and field behavior (List 2006; Cardenas and Carpenter
2008; Ehmke and Shogren 2008). On one hand, such studies confirm many of the findings
on bounded rationality of laboratory experiments and thus provide support for the validity of
lab results. On the other hand some studies suggest that bounded rationality is slightly less
pronounced in the field. Recently, laboratory experiments have even questioned the robust-
ness of certain behavioral failures. For example, Gunnarsson et al. (2003) find that market
arbitrage removes preference reversals, while Cherry et al. (2003) find a similar result for
environmental lotteries.
We classify insights from behavioral economics into two broad themes: bounded
rationality and limited self-interest. Bounded rationality involves behavioral anomalies1
in choice under risk and uncertainty, intertemporal choice, and other inconsistencies in
decision-making. Other-regarding preferences or limited self-interest includes all types of
other-regarding behavior and motivations, such as fairness, altruism, reciprocity and prefer-
ences for self-identity like status. In line with these various behavioral categories we consider
relevant alternative behavioral theories. Table 1 provides a summary.
1 Similar terms like behavioral anomaly, deviation, failure, bias and judgment problems describe behavior
deviating from perfect rationality.
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2.1 Limited Rationality
Herbert Simon (1955) defined psychological principles of individual behavior and first rec-
ognized the imperfect access to information and limited computational capacities of indi-
viduals, which he called “bounded rationality”. Simon argued that only when choices are
very simple and transparent does an individual behaves like a utility maximizer. However,
when decisions are more complex, choices generally deviate from perfect rationality. In
practice, decision-making occurs under time constraints, cognitive limitations and imper-
fect or costly information. According to Simon, people are then unable to maximize their
utility and instead will “satisfice”, i.e. make a choice that is “good enough” (Simon 1959).
Subsequent research has strongly supported Simon’s intuitive assessment of human behavior
and its departures from rational choice axioms. Alternative theories of economic behavior
grounded in psychological findings have been proposed and are presented next.
2.1.1 Choice Under Risk and Uncertainty
Many patterns of observed economic behavior under risk can not be explained by standard
expected utility theory. Examples are people not cutting consumption expenditure after fac-
ing a wage cut, consumers usually choosing the default insurance offered to them, and cab
drivers always quitting around daily income targets. Field observations (Camerer 2004) and
laboratory experiments (Kahneman et al. 1990) describe such behavioral patterns. They find
that utility depends on a reference point, and is sensitive to gains and losses relative to this
point. This involves loss aversion, describing the fact that the disutility of giving up some-
thing is greater than the utility associated with acquiring something. This can explain the
insensitivity of consumption to bad news about income or the tendency of cab drivers to
work longer hours on “low-wage days”. Loss aversion can clarify a famous financial puzzle,
namely the equity premium, with stocks having a much higher return than bonds (Mehra and
Prescott 1985). An explanation for the large difference in returns found is that investors are
loss-averse, demanding a higher premium as compensation for a higher risk of losing money.
Based on experimental findings, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present an alternative
model of choice, labeled prospect theory, which challenges standard expected-utility theory
by integrating certain psychological aspects of decision-making. An important behavioral fea-
ture is that people overweight probabilities of outcomes that are considered certain in relation
to other outcomes. This is called the certainty effect which involves a risk-averse preference
for a sure gain over a probable gain with a larger expected value, and to a risk-seeking prefer-
ence for a probable loss over a certain loss with a smaller expected value. A generalization of
this is the reflection effect, which specifies that individuals are risk-averse when the outcome
is positive and risk-seeking when it is negative. This can explain, for example, that people
trading in stock markets hold losing stocks too long, and sell winning stocks too soon. In
behavioral finance, this is known as the disposition effect. The isolation effect is an example
of a decision anomaly from the viewpoint of expected-utility theory. Inconsistent prefer-
ences result from individuals basing their choices on differentiating characteristics between
alternatives and not on shared characteristics.
The case of the decision maker being uncertain about probabilities of outcomes, referred
to as ambiguity, represents another limitation to applying the expected-utility framework to
individual decision making. Ambiguity is also referred to as Knightian uncertainty based on
the seminal contribution of Knight (1921) who distinguished between measurable and unmea-
surable uncertainty, i.e. ambiguity. Under conditions of ambiguity maximization of expected
utility is not possible as this would imply knowing the probabilities of various outcomes.
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Decisions under uncertainty are affected by whether decision makers are ambiguity-averse
or not. According to Ellsberg (1961), people prefer situations involving precise probabilities
(risk) to situations with unknown probabilities or ambiguity. Several experimental studies
have examined ambiguity aversion (e.g., Slovic and Tversky 1974; Moore and Eckel 2003).
Camerer and Weber (1992) list different sources of ambiguity such as credibility of the infor-
mation source, disagreements among experts, amount of available information, and weight
of evidence. Many real life decisions involve ambiguous information about risk, such as vac-
cination decisions (negative health effects?), protection against environmental hazards (how
likely is a natural disaster?) and adoption of innovations (which benefits?). Thus people are
reluctant to vaccinate, buy insurance in order to self-protect against any uncertain outcomes,
or buy a new, unknown product.
Another relevant bias is the framing effect, according to which individual choice between
alternatives is affected by the way a problem is presented. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)
framed a hypothetical choice about combating a disease in two different ways. Probabilities
of events were the same, but in one case the alternatives were described in terms of saving
people and in the other case in terms of deaths. The experiment showed that the certainty
of saving people was judged disproportionately attractive, and the certainty of deaths dis-
proportionately aversive, which violates classical expected utility theory. Other phenomena
better explained by prospect theory than by standard theory are the endowment or status quo
effect, the default bias and mental accounting.
The notion of placing a higher value on something we own has been repeatedly shown
in experiments and also observed in real life situations. That is, people tend to value goods
more if they involve ownership, i.e. they express a preference for a particular reference point,
namely the endowment. This contradicts standard theory which says that preferences are
invariant with respect to the current endowment. Evidence from Kahneman et al. (1990) is
based on dividing students into three groups. One group was given a choice between a mug
worth $4.95 and a chocolate bar worth $6.00, and 56% chose the mug over the chocolate
bar. A second group first got the mug and was then given the opportunity to trade it for the
chocolate bar; here, 89% chose to keep their mug. Students in the third group were first given
the chocolate bar and then the opportunity to trade it for a mug. 90% chose to keep their
chocolate.
Further experimental evidence has identified reference points other than initial endow-
ment, referred to as status quo or default bias. For example, individuals were asked to make
a choice about investment options with different risk ratings. It was found that an option
became significantly more popular when it was designated as the status quo or default. One
other effect worth mentioning is that loss aversion implies asymmetric price elasticities of
demand, reflecting the fact that consumers are more sensitive or responsive to price increases
(for normal goods) than price cuts (Kahneman et al. 1991; Caballero 2004).
A main departure from the linear processing of probabilities in expected utility theory is
provided by prospect theory, which models individual attitudes toward probabilities with a
so-called ‘probability weighting function’. It allows for different weights on gains and losses.
Useful insights emerge from extensions of prospect theory. Kahneman and Tversky (1992)
propose a modification of their original theory, which is sometimes referred to as cumulative
prospect theory, using a probability weighting function on probability ranks of outcomes2
instead of single probabilities. This function is able to accommodate the commonly observed
overweighting of extreme events with low probabilities and high consequences. Another
2 The rank of a positive outcome x , or good-news probability, is defined as the probability of getting an
outcome better than x .
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modification of expected utility theory is prospective reference theory by Viscusi (1989). He
suggests that next to expert assessments of risks individual perceptions of risks play an impor-
tant role in individual decisions. The latter may deviate considerably from risk judgments by
experts. Therefore, behavior may be different from what is expected if one would assume a
fully rational assessment of risk by individuals. Decisions are made according to a perceived
risk which is a function of a prior risk belief and experts risk assessment. The discrepancy
between an individual’s perceived probability and the actual risk may lead to decision biases.
For example, the choice of the level of insurance depends on the perceived risk. Factors
that restrain this relationship may decrease the incentive and willingness to protect, i.e. the
purchase of insurance. Hence, failure to adequately perceive risks may lead to inadequate
precautions or level of insurance. Viscusi (1995) suggest two policy interventions to alleviate
such failures. Biases that distort individual decisions can be restrained by altering risk per-
ception through information provision or regulation of risk, e.g. offer mandatory insurance.
Risk information and risk control may alter and influence risk perceptions and consequently
decisions. Related work on decisions involving risk illustrates the limits of human rationality.
Kunreuther et al. (1978) and Slovic et al. (1982) provide empirical evidence documenting
such biases with respect to natural disaster, insurance decisions and responses to hazardous
activities. They find, for example, that self-protection might be hampered by bounded ratio-
nality. Zeckhauser and Viscusi (1990) argue for improved information mechanisms through
government interventions to overcome human limitations on individual choices.
Behavioral economics has regularly found preference reversal, also referred to as con-
structed preferences, which is a violation of procedure invariance. The latter means that
certain preferences are invariant with regard to the procedure used to elicit them. Experimen-
tal evidence shows that the procedure for eliciting choices affects the order of preference,
showing that there are no pre-defined preferences but that these are, in some way, constructed
in the elicitation process (Lichtenstein and Slovic 1971; Tversky and Thaler 1990).
2.1.2 Intertemporal Choice
Normative theory proposes the standard discounted utility model, weighting utilities by an
exponentially declining discount factor. Exponential discounting yields time-consistent pref-
erences, meaning that individuals act according to their long-run interest when making deci-
sions over time. However, individuals show behavior over time that is inconsistent with this.
For example, they regularly show time-inconsistent preferences in decision-making charac-
terized by discount rates varying over time. This means they have distinct preferences over
nearby and distant choices, violating the principle of exponential discounting. Instead they
employ short-run discount rates which are higher than long-run ones, known as hyperbolic
discounting. Such behavior might imply that people make short-sighted decisions when cost
and benefits are immediate, referred to as the immediacy effect or myopia choice behavior.
This type of behavior has been interpreted as a lack of self-control or present-biased prefer-
ences, with choices being dominated by immediate benefits (Laibson 1997; O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999). This can result, for example, in individuals consuming their savings (Ashraf
et al. 2006), buying addictive products, or showing bad habits such as smoking (Thaler
and Shefrin 1981; Wertenbroch 1998; Frederick et al. 2002). Happiness research (Frey and
Stutzer 2006) supports the role of time-inconsistent preferences by providing empirical evi-
dence that individuals put a heavy weight on the present situation, focus on immediate
utility and make inconsistent choices over time. This has immediate policy implications: for
instance, whereas standard economic theory predicts that a tax on smoking will reduce not
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only one’s consumption but also one’s well-being, happiness research suggests a positive
effect on subjective well-being.
Many instances of economic behavior can be explained by habits, which can be described
as well-practiced activities of everyday behavior (Verplanken and Aarts 1999). According
to rational choice theory, habits are a type of addictive behavior. Becker and Murphy (1988)
propose a model of rational addiction that accounts for past consumption effects. Behavioral
economics emphasizes that habitual behavior can be explained by having time inconsistent-
preferences. Indeed, habit formation is defined as follows: “[…] the more of the product
a person has consumed in the past, the more he desires the product now” (O’Donoghue
and Rabin 2000: 1). As a result, individuals sometimes make decisions which are not in
their best long-run interest. The interaction between habits and choice behavior has also
been approached from an evolutionary point of view. This involves concepts like routines,
automatic behavior, behavioral lock-in and path dependency (Hodgson 2004).
Other anomalous temporal choice patterns include, among others, the magnitude effect—
discount rates for losses being higher than for gains; the sign effect—gains being discounted
more than losses; the sequence effect—individuals preferring improving sequences such as
an increasing wage profile; and negative time discounting—utility can be derived from the
mere anticipation of a future gain. For more effects and details see Loewenstein and Prelec
(1992); O’Donoghue and Rabin (2000) and Frederick et al. (2002).
2.1.3 Judgment Problems
Behavioral economics proposes that people do not behave rationally in the case of complex
and infrequent decision-making. Experiments have assessed that they make use of heuris-
tics in order to reduce complexity in decision-making. In general, heuristics can be quite
useful when time and cognitive abilities are limited, but they also can lead to systematic
errors of judgment, violating standard statistical laws and Bayes rule. The three most com-
mon heuristics in probability judgment are the availability, representativeness and anchoring
heuristics.
The availability heuristic describes people’s assessment of the probability of an event
where the probability of recent instances and events with a relatively large class is overesti-
mated because these are more easily mentally available and imaginable. An example is that
the subjective probability of traffic accidents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned
by the side of the road. People using the representativeness heuristic are likely to evaluate
probabilities by the degree to which one event is representative of, or resembles, other events.
In addition, people judge a frequency by comparing the similarity of the case with the image
or stereotype of the class, often to the exclusion of prior probabilities, base-rate frequen-
cies, sample size, and other factors that should affect probability judgments. The anchoring
or adjustment heuristic reflects the fact that estimates are heavily biased towards a given
starting point or initial value. For example, in an experimental study people being asked to
estimate the number of African countries in the United Nations were given an arbitrary num-
ber between 0 and 100 (starting point) before their evaluation. Their estimate was reported
as being biased towards the assigned arbitrary starting point (Kahneman and Tversky 1974).
The tendency to reach judgments that reflect a self-serving bias, i.e. mixing what is fair
with what benefits oneself, presents another behavioral anomaly in decision-making. This is
evident in many judgment situations, such as people overestimating their own contribution
to joint tasks, people tending to attribute their successes to ability and skill, but their failures
to bad luck, and people being likely to arrive at judgments of what is fair or right which
are biased on the direction of their own self-interests. Similarly, the optimism bias shows
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that people are overconfident about their own relative abilities and unreasonably optimistic
about their futures. Overconfidence can explain, for example, a high rate of business failures
(Camerer 1999).
Besides violations of probability judgment, behavioral decision theory describes other
cognitive anomalies where individual decision-making deviates from rational choice axi-
oms (Rabin 1998; McFadden 1999). Some findings are as follows. Decision anomalies
arising from the way individuals process information include: order effects—individuals
establish aspiration levels (reference points) and set goals relative to these benchmarks, or
are influenced by ethical and superstitious beliefs; primacy (recency) effects—initial (most
recent) experiences are more readily recalled than ones in between; focal effects—categorical
approximations are used to minimize recall and reporting effort; isolation or cancellation
effects—common aspects of alternative lotteries are ignored when they are compared; and
segregation effects—riskless components of a lottery are evaluated separately. Choices are
also influenced by the context in which they are made. For example, the addition of another
option to a choice problem may enhance the attractiveness of the existing options. Information
that seems most relevant at the moment may be overemphasized in relation to other informa-
tion, known as the saliency or prominent effect. The projection effect means that individuals
might make judgment errors because their decision is misled by a broader but irrelevant con-
text. And the misinterpretation effect reflects the fact that individuals misinterpret judgments
due to a real or perceived strategic advantage.
Next, the concept of mental accounting3 by Thaler (1980) provides further evidence that
consumers act in a manner that is fundamentally inconsistent with standard economic theory.
Mental accounting is the activity of individuals or households to organize, evaluate and keep
track of their financial activities. People keep mental accounts for different expenses, such
as food, clothing, entertainment and education. This violates the standard view that money
is fungible, i.e. that any unit of money is can be replaced by another (Thaler 1999).
Recent research has introduced emotions into economic decision-making models. Neuro-
economics has helped in obtaining insights about behavior and explaining visceral influences
like emotions or fatigue in decision-making. Neuroeconomics combines economic theory
with a broader understanding of the mechanics of the brain. For example, emotions do not
necessarily comply with utility maximization rules. It is found that immediate emotions, i.e.
affectiveness or feeling which is unrelated to the decision at hand, can have a significant
impact on choice. An example of the emotional influence on decision-making is that due
to current arousal people make decisions they will regret later on (Loewenstein and Lerner
2003).
2.2 Limited Self-Interest
Standard economic theory on which environmental policy theory is based assumes that eco-
nomic behavior is explained by people pursuing only self-interest. Any other-regarding pref-
erences are excluded. People holding other-regarding preferences value outcomes of other
people either positively or negatively (Camerer and Fehr 2006). For example, people voting
or making voluntary contributions to public goods, such as blood donations and voluntary
collection and recycling of waste, cannot be explained solely by pure self-interest. Behavioral
3 The idea that choices are altered through the introduction of boundaries, named choice bracketing is a
related concept. It describes the grouping of individual choices together into sets (Read et al. 1999). Similarly,
rule-driven behavior is described by McFadden (1999, 85) as judgment being “…guided by principles, analo-
gies, and exemplars rather than utilitarian calculus”. For example, people develop rules for money, so-called
accounts, applying to living or food expenses.
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economics suggests that the individual utility function has to be modified to take account of
two types of other-regarding preferences: (1) non-selfish motives or social preferences, such
as fairness, reciprocity, altruism and intrinsic motivations; and (2) self-identity concerns,
such as reputation, self-respect and status. Several studies have examined how economic
behavior is influenced by other-regarding preferences (Andreoni 1989; Rabin 1993; Frey
1997; Lindbeck 1997; Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bénabou and Tirole 2003).
An important line of experimental research suggests that fairness motives affect people’s
behavior. Fairness is generally defined as people caring about equitable outcomes and is
also referred to as inequality aversion, which denotes the fact that people prefer equal dis-
tributions of payoffs (Smith 1991; Fehr and Schmidt 1999). Experimental games, such as
ultimatum and public goods games, have shown that people hold preferences which depart
from pure self-interest. In particular, people care for equitable outcomes and behave fairly
and cooperatively in many situations where the self-interest model would predict complete
defection. Kahneman et al. (1986) document that consumers’ strong sense of the fairness of
a firm’s pricing decisions can explain why monopolists have to set the price below the price
predicted by theory, and thus cannot fully exploit their monopoly power. Some studies have
combined ethnographic and experimental approaches to provide cross-cultural evidence for
fairness preferences in the field (Heinrich et al. 2001).
Experimental evidence supports another type of social preference, namely reciprocal
behavior (Fehr and Gächter 2004). Reciprocity means that, in response to friendly actions,
people frequently react more cooperatively than suggested by standard theory. Likewise, neg-
ative reciprocity also exists, i.e. people respond non-cooperatively to hostile actions (Rabin
1993; Falk and Fischbacher 2006). Research has shown that reciprocity can have impor-
tant economic implications in areas like work motivation and contract enforcement (Fehr
and Gächter 2000). Falk (2004) extends findings on reciprocity by using field data to assess
motives behind charitable giving. Related to reciprocity is the concept of conditional coopera-
tion, asserting that people cooperate if others cooperate too. For instance, pro-social behavior
is conditional on other people’s cooperative behavior. In particular, the persistence of such
behavior has been explored in the context of social dilemmas or collective action problems,
such as tax compliance, common pool resource use, democracy and “not in my backyard”
situations (Ostrom 1998; Karp 2005).
Altruism means that individuals help others while making sacrifices. Altruistic traits can
have important consequences for economic behavior in the family and work place (Simon
1992). Andreoni (1989, 1990) suggested that people derive utility from the act of giving,
labeled the “warm glow effect”. This model of human behavior is also referred to as impure
altruism. In addition, studies document heterogeneity in altruistic behavior. Besides pure and
impure (utilitarian) altruism, a third type is encountered, namely people undertaking altruistic
or pro-social activities in order to improve their self-image. However, this may mean they
do not care as much about the outcome of their pro-social behavior as they do about the way
their behavior affects their self-identity. In order to self-signal reputation or status, people
undertake activities such as conforming to social norms (Bénabou and Tirole 2006).
An agent’s consumption behavior is best understood within a social context, as it is shaped
by imitation, comparison with and learning from others, and status effects (Heinrich and Boyd
1998). Happiness research has provided strong evidence that welfare is affected by many
factors other than income and consumption, including status (Postlewaite 1998; Weiss and
Fershtman 1998; Easterlin 2001; Frank 2005a). Social status relates to the relative position
of an individual in a society and can be expressed in many forms: social recognition, self-
respect, honor, esteem, social standing, and prestige. Individuals strive not only for material
reward in terms of money payoffs but also for social rewards. For example, a car might not
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only be bought for its use value but also to attain status. Veblen (1899) already noted the
function of consumption in attaining social status and power. Consumption displays not only
one’s income and wealth to others but also one’s position in society. In his seminal contri-
bution Duesenberry (1949) acknowledged that relative income determines the consumption
and saving patterns of households. Brekke and Howarth (2000) note the symbolic meaning
of goods, stating that commodities may serve to communicate one’s self-image to others or
reinforce it.
Many of these ideas relate to evidence that, in various cases, people behave as if they were
intrinsically motivated rather than stimulated by any financial reward (material self-interest),
as suggested by standard economic theory. For policy, there is supporting experimental evi-
dence on the conflict between external incentives (rewards or punishment) and intrinsic moti-
vation. Deci (1972) reported that, in order to increase the intrinsic motivations of children,
employees or students, policy makers should beware of concentrating on external incentives,
like monetary rewards, because they can decrease such motivations. Experimental and field
evidence has confirmed that external incentives can crowd out intrinsic motivations (Frey
1997; Bénabou and Tirole 2003), sometimes referred to as moral motivations (Brekke et al.
2003). For example, increased pay for workers can undermine their intrinsic motivation to
work. Another example provided by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) shows the effect of mone-
tary incentives on stimulating parents to pick their children up on time. It is found that a mon-
etary punishment leads to the reverse of intended effect—parents arrive even later. Carpenter
and Myers (2007), using data on volunteer firefighters, find that pro-social behavior can be
crowded out by extrinsic monetary incentives. Frey and Jegen (2001) review other evidence.
The effect of non-pecuniary incentives on pro-social behavior has received relatively little
attention in economic policy analysis. Extrinsic incentives in the form of social approval,
ostracism, or public embarrassment can serve as a punishment or reward to stimulate certain
types of behavior. Such social incentives operate through feelings of status, esteem, pride or
fear. Concrete channels to implement them are public disclosure and awards or prizes. For
example, Frey and Neckermann (2008) have studied social awards in the form of public rec-
ognition as a mechanism to improve cooperation in a work place setting. They point out that
the main difference with monetary compensation is that awards stimulate social recognition
and social reinforcement and so are less likely to crowd out intrinsic motivations. In addition,
incentives in the form of awards have a long term effect in the sense that they create role mod-
els and thus distribute information about desirable behavior. Another example showing the
positive effect of non-pecuniary incentives on fostering altruistic behavior is an experimental
study by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008). They illustrate that anticipated verbal rewards
and punishments in the form of written feedback induce a higher rate of altruistic behavior.
Positive feedback result from symbolic rewards evoking feelings of pride, while negative
feedback is due to symbolic punishment causing feelings of shame which individuals tend
to avoid.
In addition to looking at the separate effect of immaterial punishment or rewards, some
studies have examined their interaction with material incentives. For example, Noussair and
Tucker (2005) find that contributions to a public good are higher when material and informal
punishment mechanisms are applied in combination than when only one of the two forms of
punishment is used. An empirical example of using social incentives for rule enforcement is
the implementation of a public embarrassment mechanism in the form of a public mocking
campaign in the city of Bogota to endorse compliance with traffic laws. In order to promote
rule compliance by individuals, the public administration made use of mimes in the city’s
streets to shame traffic violators. This type of public disclosure of citizen behavior makes
use of peoples’ aversion to be disapproved or shamed in front of others (Caballero 2004).
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3 Heterogeneity, Evolution and Happiness
This section is intended to broaden the picture somewhat, focusing on three interrelated
themes. It will not offer a full review of all relevant issues associated with each theme. This
would require a book format. Instead, we want to clarify the way in which the translation of
rather abstract and isolated insights from behavioral economics to policy can be made more
relevant, complete and effective.
Standard economic theory generally assumes representative agents, even though a pop-
ulation of heterogeneous agents is more typical of reality. People show varying degrees of
bounded rationality, and self- versus other-regarding preferences (Andreoni and Miller 2002).
For instance, Fischbacher and Gächter (2006), performing a public good experiment, find
heterogeneity of social preferences. An important implication of the existence of heterogene-
ity is interaction between these different agents. For example, other-regarding individuals can
generate a cooperative outcome if they provide incentives for selfish individuals to behave
pro-socially. Likewise, self-interested individual can trigger non-cooperative behavior. Thus,
the interaction of heterogeneous preferences of individuals may affect the aggregate outcome
(Camerer and Fehr 2006; Gächter 2006). Therefore, taking multiple, heterogeneous individ-
uals into account can lead to a better and more realistic view of behavior and prediction of
outcomes. Also, in order to specify a complete model of relative positions, status, imitation
and information diffusion, the representative agent model needs to be replaced by a model of
interaction between multiple, similar but heterogeneous agents. This implies an evolutionary
approach in which selection and innovation interact to change the diversity of behaviors.
Such an evolutionary view of economic behavior and interaction has various implications
for public policy (van den Bergh and Kallis 2009).
Findings from evolutionary psychology can enhance our understanding of how prefer-
ences, beliefs and rationality are shaped (Robson 2002). Recently, Robson (2001), Robson
(2002) has written on the biological basis of economic behavior. He argues, much in line with
evolutionary psychology, that our behavior was shaped during millions of years living in small
hunter-gatherer groups. This might imply that our behavior is inappropriate for, or at least not
well adapted to, current circumstances, including the objectives of sustainable consumption
and development (Jackson 2000; Siebenhüner 2000). Robson make some interesting points.
Fitness suggests that relative success is more important than absolute success, which can
translate to interdependent preferences and relative welfare. The evolutionary explanation of
human intelligence as resulting from strategic, social interactions—through runaway selec-
tion, or an arms race of rational features—seems to have created a much greater capacity
for rational behavior in social contexts than in abstract or laboratory situations. This can be
explained by the evolution of a ‘theory of mind’ or advanced form of empathy. This, in turn,
raises some doubt over findings by experimental economics and is somewhat supportive of
rationality. Robson argues that by considering the two hypotheses—ecological (evolution in
response to environment or other species)—and social—explaining the evolution of human
intelligence—more can be understood about the limits and anomalies of human intelligence.
Besides experiments, happiness research has contributed considerably to a better under-
standing of the determinants of behavior and subjective well-being (Frey and Stutzer 2002). It
allows for evaluating the effects of cognitive biases or social motives on well-being. Whereas
standard economics regards certain types of behavior as welfare-decreasing, using an abstract
formulation of welfare, from the point of view of subjective well-being there often is no
clear loss of welfare. For instance, Meier (2007) finds that other-regarding behavior like
volunteering can contribute positively to well-being. Happiness research can also help to
assess whether individuals make systematic errors in consumption decisions, i.e. not showing
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utility-maximizing behavior. For instance, Stutzer and Frey (2006) document empirical find-
ings on subjective well-being suggesting that self-control problems, such as smoking, influ-
ence life satisfaction. Last but not least, happiness research assesses the heterogeneity of
individuals’ preferences, which can serve as input for modeling heterogeneity in populations
of interactive agents as outlined above.
4 Implications of Behavioral Economics for Individual Decision-Making
and the Environment
An integration of psychology and economics as in behavioral economics can lead to better
predictions of economic behavior and, subsequently, to better policy descriptions (Camerer
1999). Limitations to rationality and self-interest in individual decision-making mean that
certain policies will not be as effective and efficient as predicted by standard theory. Below, we
will translate insights from behavioral economics to the context of individual environmental
decision making.
Table 2 lists important behavioral findings, associated behavioral theories, and their con-
sequences for environmental economics. The assessment is based on a review of relevant
theoretical, empirical and experimental studies covering four important areas relating to
environmental policy where individual behavior and decision-making matter: environmental
valuation, sustainable consumption, policy design, and the particular and the topical case of
climate change policy. This section and Sect. 5 present details for each of these areas.
4.1 Pro-Environmental Behavior, Consumption and the Environment
Consumers make choices in a number of domains that have environmental impacts. They buy
products, use water and energy, and discard waste. Standard neoclassical-economic analysis
focuses on policy that emphasizes the impact of income and prices on behavior. As we have
seen in previous sections, this, however, does not represent a correct and complete picture
of individual behavior. Bounded rationality and factors other than price and income, such as
loss aversion, social interactions, imitation and status, determine consumer preferences. A
behavioral approach to the analysis of consumer behavior acknowledges the limits to ratio-
nality and self-interest. It also needs to account for psychological factors (van den Bergh
2008).
The important role of bounded rationality in individual decisions on energy use and con-
servation is supported by many studies (van Raaij and Verhallen 1983; Stern 1992; Faiers
et al. 2007). A well-known finding is the energy-efficiency paradox. It refers to the persistence
of a gap between current and optimal (cost-effective) energy use and thus conservation. The
literature suggests market failures are the main cause of the slow spread of energy efficiency.
Examples of such barriers include adaptation, lack of public concern for energy issues and
limited information (Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Levine et al. 1995). In addition, behavioral
anomalies, such as risk aversion, inertia or routines and habits, affect energy use (Rohdin
et al. 2007; Wilson and Dowlatabadi 2007). Prospect theory has been used to study house-
hold switching behavior in electricity markets (Defeuilley 2009; Ek and Söderholm 2008a;
Juliosson et al. 2007). This includes addressing behavioral anomalies like loss aversion,
default bias and the status quo effect as possible explanations for consumer behavior. Ek
and Söderholm (2008a) find empirical evidence that the choice of households to switch to
other service providers is influenced by a status quo effect. Pichert and Katsikopoulos (2008)
offer an experimental analysis of consumer decision-making relating to green electricity use.
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They examine peoples’ motivation for choosing green electricity in a laboratory experiments
and find that default options have a strong influence on consumer choice. A policy lesson
drawn is that, in order to promote pro-environmental behavior, green electricity should be
presented as the default option for consumers. A more theoretical study of adoption, con-
sumption and green products is Janssen and Jager (2002).
Another strand of research examines time-inconsistent preferences, considering the role of
habits and routines in (un)sustainable consumption (Jackson 2005; Stern 2000). This mainly
deals with two particular domains, namely energy use and transport issues. A fairly exten-
sive literature in psychology addresses habitual car use behavior (Gärling and Axhausen
2003; Verplanken and Aarts 1999). In addition, experimental studies have been devoted to
examining the context of habits and travel choice behavior. For instance, using data from
a field experiment in Sweden, Eriksson et al. (2008) argue that habitual behavior appears
as a key factor in choosing means of transport. A reduction in car use may be facilitated
by interrupting habitual car use by means of a so-called “deliberation intervention”, in par-
ticular if the car user has both a strong car habit and a strong moral motivation to reduce
personal car use (Carrus et al. 2008). With regard to energy consumption, habits have served
as an explanation for the efficiency paradox mentioned above (Marechal 2009; Schleich and
Gruber 2008). Empirical studies also demonstrate how to direct energy saving choices in
the presence of habits (Stern 1992; Barr et al. 2005). One policy lesson is that a behavioral
change in lifestyles fostering energy saving might be facilitated by promotional techniques
like the provision of information in various ways (Abrahamse et al. 2005).
Standard analysis sees pro-environmental behavior, i.e. voluntary contributions to a public
environmental good or natural resource, within the context of social dilemmas. Tradition-
ally, the private provision of a public good fails due to its characteristic of being non-rival
and non-excludable. Selfish individuals have no incentive to contribute, and may free ride
on its provision. However, from a behavioral economics perspective, concerns about social
preferences and self-identity can lead to voluntary contributions to an environmental public
good. Not only are these motivations important for purely social dilemmas but they may
generally influence consumer decisions about buying and using goods and services (with
environmental impacts).
Studies assessing additional motives for behavior use empirical data on household energy
use (Clark et al. 2003; Menges et al. 2005; Kotchen and Moore 2007) or recycling activ-
ities (Ackerman 1997; Berglund 2006). For instance, Kotchen and Moore (2007) analyze
the motivation of households to participate in green electricity programs using empirical
data from the US. Presenting a theoretical framework which covers different participation
mechanisms for green electricity programs, their results show that households which have a
greater concern for the environment or stronger altruistic attitudes are more likely to adopt
green electricity. Similarly, Clark et al. (2003), in a study of Dutch households, investigate the
influence of internal (altruism) and external variables (demographics) on household partici-
pation in green electricity programs. They also find that a high intrinsic motivation and values
like altruism may explain early adoption of green electricity. Another study by Menges et al.
(2005) is worth mentioning. It performs an experiment instead of an empirical analysis to
test for the presence of “warm glow” motivation when adopting green electricity programs.
The authors conclude that people receive benefits from solely contributing to environmental
quality when participating in a green electricity program. Recycling and waste disposal at
household level is costly, i.e. messy and time consuming. Households might not be aware of
the social benefits gained through proper waste management because they are hardly notice-
able, which makes free riding more likely. Individual moral and social motives for recycling
activities are important determinants of people’s willingness to pay for sorting waste. These
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motivations significantly lower the costs associated with household recycling efforts which
will affect the adequate regulatory policy. Brekke et al. (2007) analyze recycling of house-
hold waste as a prime example of voluntary contribution to a public good, since collecting
and recycling are costly and any environmental benefits resulting have a clear public good
character, i.e. are non-rival and non-excludable, and are hardly noticeable to the household
itself. In an empirical study conducted in Norway it is found that civic duty orientation is
an important motive for recycling behavior. Ackerman (1997) found that altruistic consid-
erations dominate in collection and recycling efforts undertaken by households. Similarly,
Berglund (2006) shows that people may derive positive “warm glow” feelings by contributing
to a better environment through recycling. Halvorsen (2008) uses empirical data on recycling
activities by Norwegian households to study how social and moral norms affect their utility.
Norm-based incentives like feelings of self-respect and “warm glow” turn out to contribute
significantly to recycling efforts.
Some studies include psychological factors like status or behavior by others in their anal-
ysis of environmentally relevant behavior. Ek and Söderholm (2008b) do this in a study of
electricity use, and Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006) in a study of car purchase. The
latter study acknowledges that the status effect is difficult to disentangle using consumption
data for goods and thus it is not always clear how important status is when making consump-
tion decisions. Ek and Söderholm find that a choice between green and other electricity is
determined not only by economic factors but also by the presence of status behavior and
relative positions. Their analysis shows that self-image is affected not only by the behavior
of others but also by the purchase of green goods. Such findings are in line with Bénabou
and Tirole (2006) who suggest that people undertake activities to highlight their good traits,
such as pro-social activities, in particular pro-environmental behavior.
Experimental evidence from common-pool resource and public good games supports the
influence of, amongst others, reciprocity, fairness, social norms and self-identity concerns
within the framework of social dilemmas. Behavioral economics suggests that the establish-
ment of conditions under which people cooperate and show reciprocity behavior can solve
social dilemmas (Fleishman 1988; Ostrom 1990; Brown and Stewart 1998). In particular,
field experiments associated with common-pool resources such as fisheries and forests con-
firm the importance of these issues in natural settings (Velez et al. 2009; Cardenas et al. 2000;
Cardenas and Ostrom 2004; Rodríguez-Sickert et al. 2008). Other examples are reciprocal
behaviors found in the context of blood donations (Titmuss 1970), contributions to a social
fund (Frey and Meier 2004), and employment relations (Gneezy and List 2006) (see also
Sect. 2.2). Only a few natural field experiments investigate the role of reciprocity within a
specific environmental context. For example, Alpizar et al. (2008) offer an analysis of the
importance of reciprocity for voluntary contributions to a national park in Costa Rica using a
natural field experiment. They find that reciprocity behavior induces more people to contrib-
ute financially to the park. Their results highlight that information about the determinants of
voluntary contributions can assist in the design of strategies and policies aimed at increasing
contributions to the financing of public goods. Biel and Thøgersen (2007) review motiva-
tions for submitting to environmental compliance, like social norms supporting cooperation
behavior.
4.2 Environmental Valuation and Individual Decision-Making
There is a considerable literature on the monetary valuation of environmental goods. Two
important reasons for undertaking valuation research are to inform policy makers about
the value of non-market goods and the size of environmental externalities. Several studies
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have connected valuation research approaches or outcomes to behavioral economics. This
involves examining responses to contingent valuation surveys, including potential psycho-
logical biases and social preferences For example, experimental evidence reported by
Kahneman et al. (1990) supports the endowment effect, a decision anomaly of expected
utility theory, as a reason for response behavior in valuation studies. Here, a reference posi-
tion shapes preferences, that is, the value of a good is affected by ownership. Evidence for
the importance of other-regarding preferences is provided by Kahneman and Knetsch (1992)
who found that an individual’s contribution to a public good makes them feel good, some-
thing they referred to as “purchase of moral satisfaction”, leading to a gap between stated
willingness to pay and real economic preferences.
The role of preference anomalies in contingent valuation studies and other preference
elicitation methods questions the validity of cost-benefit analysis to inform public policy.
If revealed preferences deviate from rational choice theory, then cost-benefit analysis using
results from monetary valuation studies, which assume rational agents, might be misleading.
In order to assure robust results from cost-benefit analysis it is suggested to either “uncouple”
cost-benefit analysis from the assumption of preference coherence (Sugden 2005)4 or incor-
porate “suitable controls” for the type of errors that may arise (Braga and Starmer 2005).
Neither of these proposals, however, seems to have been very well elaborated yet. A more
radical alternative is rejecting cost benefit analysis and replacing it by multi-criteria analysis
or participatory approaches (see for example, Munda 2004). These evidently are not free of
criticism either.
We do not offer further details here as unlike the other intersections of behavioral
and environmental economics, this one has been covered quite well in recent reviews.
Johansson-Stenman (2002) and Hanley and Shogren (2005) provide surveys of the evidence
of anomalies and their impact on preference elicitation methods and cost-benefit analysis.
For a summary of field data on preference inconsistencies and their impact on US policy
makers see List (2005).
5 Implications of Bounded Rationality and Limited Self-Interest
for Environmental Policy Theory
Several authors have attempted to use alternative models of individual behavior to provide a
foundation for the theory (or theories) of environmental policy and institutions (Ostrom 1990;
Sanstad and Howarth 1994; Norton et al. 1998; van den Bergh et al. 2000; Shogren 2002;
Vatn 2005). Early experiments in environmental economics on environmental valuation, pub-
lic goods and the Coase theorem (Bohm 1972; Hoffman and Spitzer 1982; Brookshire et al.
1990), as well as more recent research (List 2006; Shogren and Taylor 2008), explore specific
behavioral anomalies in relation to environmental policy.
We consider environmental policy under a range of behavioral assumptions, con-
sistent with findings of behavioral economics as documented in previous sections.
Inspired by Hahn (1989), who investigated whether the patient (environmental pol-
icy) followed the doctor’s advice, this paper aims to examine if the doctor (envi-
ronmental economics) is prescribing the right medicine (i.e. using correct behavioral
assumptions).
4 Sugden (2009) concludes that values based on hedonic prices may be less susceptible to WTA/WTP dis-
parities than values obtained with stated-preference methods.
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5.1 General Policy Insights
This section addresses the question of the implications that observed bounded rationality and
other-regarding behavior have for the design of environmental policy. Only a few studies
have devoted explicit attention to this. Shogren and Taylor (2008) define a new, behavioral
environmental second-best problem. That is, they regard bounded rationality as a type of
market failure which needs correction through public policy. Environmental policies should
thus be considered to correct not only for traditional market failures but also for behavioral or
rationality failures. Environmental policy should, then, generally be designed in such a way
that it corrects for both market failures (environmental externalities) and behavioral failures.
For example, regarding firm behavior, Venkatachalam (2008) notes that status quo bias can
explain lobbying activities by polluting companies. They prefer the present situation and
prefer to stick to inefficient command-and-control policies instead of having their emissions
controlled through more efficient, market-based instruments. These observations imply a less
optimistic view of efficient policy than neoclassical economics.
Inconsistencies and biases due to heuristics in individual decision-making can lead to
inconsistent evaluation of public policy. In particular, framing effects are relevant for the
evaluation of tax policy (McCaffery and Baron 2006). Nash (2006) analyzes the effect
of framing on environmental policy choice by the policy-maker, and indirectly by soci-
ety and its various stakeholder groups (consumers, voters, business community, environ-
mental NGOs). He finds that framing effects affect public perception of and reaction to
the choice of command-and-control policies over market-based instruments. For exam-
ple, market-based instruments give the “right to pollute” rather than take it away from
polluters (i.e. before regulation they implicitly had a right to pollute). This means they
are framed as creating an environmental loss. In order to reduce such biases, he sug-
gests educational measures or changes in the way a regulatory instrument is framed. For
instance, when framing a tradable permit system, permits might be referred to as “emis-
sion penalty” rather than “right to pollute”. Löfgren and Nordblom (2006) present a for-
mal analysis answering the question how consumption of a habitual good, which causes
a negative external effect on the environment, affects environmental taxation. They find
that the magnitude of tax rates is affected by habit formation. A stronger habit tends to
increase consumption, so the optimal correcting tax should also be increased. Johansson
(1997) analyses behavior driven by social preferences and environmental taxation. More
specifically, he studies the effects of different kinds of altruistic behavior on the design of
a Pigovian tax to correct for an externality. He finds that altruism affects the size of the
tax.
Theoretical studies have examined the environmental regulation of household consump-
tion behavior in the presence of status effects and relative positions (Hirsch 1976; Howarth
1996; Brekke and Howarth 2000; Brekke et al. 2002). Howarth (1996) presents a theoretical
analysis of the relationship between status, consumption levels and environmental degra-
dation. He modifies preferences by incorporating status effects into a standard model of
pollution. Status has a positive effect on consumption. In order to arrive at a social optimum,
consumption taxes are needed in addition to environmental taxes. For environmental policy,
this really means that Pigovian taxes should be adjusted upwards in the presence of status
effects (see also Wender 2005). Brekke et al. (2002) evaluate the Hirsch (1976) hypothesis,
i.e. status seeking increases consumption at the cost of environmental degradation. They
conclude that this only holds true when status is defined as the difference between one’s
individual consumption and the average consumption of society, and if status and non-status
goods are poor substitutes.
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Table 3 Change in performance of environmental policy when behavioral theories are accounted for
Efficiency Effectiveness Equity
Risk and uncertainty + + 0/+
Intertemporal choice + 0/+ 0/+
Judgment ++ ++ 0/+
Other-regarding preferences 0/+ 0/+ +
Note: signs denote changes relative to (policy under) traditional theory with rational, self-regarding agents
(“+” better performance, “++” much better performance and “0” about equal performance)
Standard criteria for policy instrument selection are economic efficiency, effectiveness
and equity. Behavioral failures and other-regarding behavior will affect the performance of
environmental policy instruments on these three criteria. This is qualitatively assessed in
Table 3, by combining the four types of behavioral features discussed in Sect. 2 with the
three policy performance criteria. Although it is not possible to make definite statements
in this respect, due to a lack of systematic research on policy performance under bounded
rationality and other-regarding behavior, a few general speculations can be offered here.
Generally, performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness can be expected to be weaker
under bounded rather than perfect rationality. For example, economic policy instruments are
based on the assumption that desirable changes in behavior can be achieved by providing
monetary incentives. But if agents are boundedly rational or act in accordance with social
motives, economic incentives may have not the intended effect on behavior, reducing policy
effectiveness. Moreover, if individuals are not reaching their individual optimum or efficient
outcome due to bounded rationality, society as a whole is unlikely to arrive at a socially
optimal outcome. On the other hand, institutions and policy instruments that stimulate social
preferences like reciprocal behavior might improve the effectiveness of policy. It is difficult
to make general statements about the equity implications of policy under bounded rational-
ity and other-regarding preferences. One possible effect is that other-regarding preferences
imply that individuals may be more concerned with equity and fairness. This in turn can lead
to individual outcomes (in terms of welfare or utility) under environmental regulation being
more in line with one another than without such inequity-averse preferences. A more equi-
table welfare distribution may then result. This holds even more so if the policy is designed
to recognize and reflect these preferences.
Bounded rationality in an intertemporal choice setting, in particular hyperbolic discount-
ing, means that long-run outcomes receive greater weight, which can stimulate more equal
intertemporal welfare distribution. The same result might hold true for decisions in line with
Prospect theory regarding long-run impacts of environmental change characterized by small-
chance/high-impact scenarios. Judgment biases might have little effect on equity or a small
positive effect if they result in less perfect, selfish decisions, so that the outcome is a less polar-
ized welfare distribution, i.e. a move to the mean. Note that in the table we assess judgment
biases as having a relatively severe impact on policy performance with regard to efficiency
and effectiveness, because these biases basically affect every decision being made by indi-
viduals and because there are so many judgment biases around. This is not to deny that in a
long-run context climate change and policy performance might be more severely affected by
boundedly rational decision-making related to risk and uncertainty and intertemporal choice.
Finally, the combination of various behavioral features like those listed in the first column of
Table 3 may mean not just an addition of specific effects on policy performance, but possibly
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a synergy. For example, judgment biases combined with intertemporal choice may mean that
the policy performance comes out worse in terms of efficiency and effectiveness than one
would estimate based on adding performance failures for each separately.
Behavioral research can inform consumer policy, accounting for cognitive biases and
decision heuristics behind household decision-making. Consumers often do not react to price
signals and do not take into account future (energy) costs because decisions are influenced by
various biases. Alternatives to price-based regulation are as follows. To promote switching
and pro-environmental behavior, green electricity should be presented as the default option
to consumers and information cost should be lowered, e.g. through standardized electricity
bills. van den Bergh (2008) proposes many alternatives to price-based policies which might
be effective under bounded rationality: technical and product-use standards, communicative
instruments (education, public awareness campaigns, providing information) and making
green alternatives like renewable energy, waste collection and “green products” more easily
accessible or available to consumers. In general, better information and educational measures
can have a positive effect on sustainable consumption behavior (Abrahamse et al. 2005). For
example, concerning the adoption of green energy Ozaki (2009) finds that social information
may be more important and successful than traditional regulation in informing consumer
choices about innovative green products as these link up with identity and self-image attri-
butes. This suggests communication of the benefits of adoption at an emotional and social
level, where the latter relates to phenomena like comparison, imitation and status seeking.
For diffusion of green products it is important to offer clear messages and create social norms
and a critical mass through different types of communication channels. Insights from social
marketing to encourage pro-environmental behavior may be useful here. Interventions by
means of paternalistic-type policies can help boundedly rational consumers to make better
decisions (Camerer et al. 2003). Examples of such policies are food content labels, warnings
on cigarette packs or mandatory retirement savings. Although such policies may be seen as
inconsistent with consumer sovereignty, they seem legitimate if consumer preferences are
inconsistent with long-run sustainability (Norton et al. 1998).
Experimental studies of time preferences, habit formation, and self-control problems pro-
vide useful information about the effectiveness of different policies on quitting and chang-
ing habits, or even creating new ones. Examples can be found for health-related behavior
(Gneezy and Rustichini 2000; Hammar and Carlsson 2001; Charness and Gneezy 2008).
Using experiments Charness and Gneezy (2008) perform a test of the effectiveness of differ-
ent policy interventions to encourage the development of a good habit, such as going to the
gym or quitting smoking. In particular, the effect of monetary incentives on fostering good
habits or stopping bad habits is found to substantially increase the probability of stopping
a bad, or starting a good habit. However, intrinsic motivations can potentially alleviate the
effect of the intervention, as in some situations economic incentives can discourage such
preferences (see Sect. 2.2.).
Recent research stresses the importance of other-regarding preferences, like reciprocity,
fairness, altruism and self-identity, for pro-social behavior. Social norms imply social rewards
instead of behavior motivated by monetary incentives. This includes norms in favor of work
habits or voluntary behavior. Some of the insights have relevance for environmental policy.
For example, the principle of inequality aversion, which predicts that people dislike inequal-
ity, can be important for various policy issues, ranging from tax morals to environmental
negotiations (see Sect. 6.2). In addition, the presence of reciprocity behavior can increase
the effectiveness of policy. Alpizar et al. (2008) provide experimental evidence that if people
receive a small gift before having to decide about contributing to a public good, this increases
the number of people making a positive contribution. On the other hand those individuals
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who would contribute without a gift are relatively unaffected. Stimulating the social norm
of reciprocity may improve the effectiveness of policy, i.e. increase the number of dona-
tions. Other insights emerge from compliance with norms shaped by whether one’s behavior
is publicly shaped or self-determined. For instance, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) identify
image-related rewards or punishment, like concerns for social reputation and self-image, as
important drivers of pro-social behavior. A public good experiment conducted by Rege and
Telle (2004) shows that social approval can considerably increase voluntary contributions
to a public good. The authors suggest identity-revelation as a relevant policy for increasing
cooperation.
From a policy perspective, the crowding-out effect of other-regarding behavior has impor-
tant implications for the provision of public goods and management of natural resources. Sev-
eral experimental studies have been conducted to provide evidence of the way that external
interventions can undermine natural resource conservation (Ostrom et al. 1994). Crowding-
out is not only limited to monetary incentives but also may result from rule enforcement,
i.e. exogenously (externally) vs. endogenously (through self-organization) enforced (Bowles
2008). These categories link to formal and informal regulation, respectively. For example,
Cardenas et al. (2000) conduct economic experiments with local users of ecosystems and
find that regulations imposed from outside a community can crowd-out social preferences
in favor of greater self-interest. This suggests that external regulations may do more harm
than good and may reduce social efficiency to lower levels compared to the case without any
outside regulation. For policy it is also of interest to know whether economic incentives and
social preferences are substitutes of any kind, in the sense that external incentives crowd-
out social preferences, or sort of complements, meaning that specific incentives stimulate
the appearance of social preferences (Bowles and Hwang 2008). In summary, experimental
evidence suggests that other-regarding motives may be affected by economic incentives and
standard policy may therefore fail, or even be counterproductive when applied to environ-
mental problems.
In Sect. 3 we briefly touched upon three themes related to behavioral economics, namely
heterogeneity, evolution and happiness. Heterogeneity and evolution are closely connected
as evolutionary thinking involving a framework developed around the notions of diversity,
population, selection, inheritance, innovation, coevolution, group selection, path-dependence
and lock-in. This relates to an often misunderstood relationship between evolution and pro-
gress, where ‘what is’ is often confused with ‘what ought to be’. However, the long-standing
debate on evolutionary progress suggests that evolution has some elements of directionality
and progress, although it is not identical with continuous progress, among other reasons
because selection is a local search process and adaptation is a compromise between different
objectives, due to historical constraints that limit evolutionary improvements, and because
of the presence of coevolution, which means that the notion of optimization in a fixed set-
ting is lost. van den Bergh and Kallis (2009) consider evolutionary policies at two levels:
institutional, i.e. policy change itself, and policy design. Central at the first level is the idea
that political and economic environments impose selective pressures on alternative political
strategies and that political agents adapt their strategies to this selection environment which
is multi-dimensional (media, elections, public opinion, power and lobbying). Historical con-
straints or path-dependencies are relevant, leading to the notion of “policy paradigm”, which
reflects the fact that earlier historical events greatly influence and hamper political and insti-
tutional developments at a later stage. This view of evolutionary policy is most developed in
the literature on innovation policy (Witt 2003) and, more recently, analysis of transitions to
sustainable energy and transport systems (Safarzynska and van den Bergh 2010), but may
also hold promises for environmental regulation given that behaviors are heterogeneous and
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interactive. It even allows for studying types of instruments other than traditional equilib-
rium analysis based on representative, rational agents. An example is a model by Nannen
and van den Bergh (2010) which assumes that the fitness of an economic strategy is deter-
mined by the relative welfare of the associated agent compared to its immediate neighbors
in a social network. This enables the study of policies affecting relative positions of indi-
viduals. Two innovative policies are analyzed, namely “prizes” or rewards, directly altering
relative welfare, and “advertisement”, affecting the social network of interactions. The study
illustrates the fact that evolutionary analysis enlarges the scope of economic policy analysis.
Finally, some of the main policy findings in the happiness literature, notably on status good
taxation, have already been mentioned. These not only show that relative positions matter for
the environmental impact of human behavior but also for human well-being. They underpin
the relevance of environmental policy instruments like information or status taxes (Brekke
and Howarth 2002) that recognize or make use of such behavioral features.
5.2 Implications for Climate Policy
The most important current area of environmental policy making is undoubtedly climate pol-
icy, covering both the mitigation and reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases and adapta-
tion to climate change. Most current proposals for climate change policy rest on assumptions
of rational behavior. Behavioral economics is particularly useful as an alternative basis for
climate policy analysis, as it offers distinct views on decision-making under risk and uncer-
tainty and in intertemporal settings. Few studies have so far addressed this issue (Gowdy
2008; Brekke and Johansson-Stenman 2008). We have summarized evidence here which
indicates that climate policy as proposed might not work as efficiently and effectively as
intended due to bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences.
The assessment of the psychological dimension of adaptation to climate change has been
so far grossly neglected. Clearly, individual decisions about adaptation to climate change
are influenced by psychological and cognitive factors, in particular concerning the evalua-
tion of risk probabilities and risk perceptions. It is important to understand the determinants
of decisions under uncertainty in order to improve individual risk judgment. The literature
suggests that the effects of decision heuristics and cognitive biases on policy success can
be profound. There is a fairly large literature on one particular cognitive factor, namely
risk perception. Empirical evidence supports biases in risk perception influencing notably
insurance and self-protection decisions focusing on natural disasters. For example, Viscusi
and Zeckhauser (2006) assess behavioral responses in the realm of risk connected to cli-
mate mitigation actions. Some of the behavioral biases or irregularities they observe are
“percent thinking bias”, i.e. individuals having problems to perceive percentages correctly,
and lack of accessibility of information, both leading to magnified estimates of risk. Similarly,
Kunreuther et al. (2010) assess behavioral failures under uncertainty. They argue that indi-
viduals use simplified decision rules and fall back onto psychological strategies that depart
from economic rationality, e.g. using heuristics such as underweighting the future, myopia in
planning, underestimating risk, optimistic bias, and forecasting errors which limit people’s
ability to invest in hazard mitigation measures. Such failures to adequately perceive risks and
process information may lead to inadequate levels of insurance and in turn to losses from nat-
ural disaster which could have been prevented. Inefficiencies that arise from decision making
deviating from rationality assumptions in the realm of natural disasters can be ameliorated,
among others, by the following policy measures: improving risk communication and imple-
menting risk control mechanisms such as mandatory insurance (Viscusi 1995); setting prior
steps to disasters to ensure efficient behavior of those expose to the risk, such as regulations
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in the form of zoning restrictions (Kunreuther and Pauly 2006); restrict voluntary choices and
impose stricter regulations; and guide individuals to make more efficient protective decisions
through readjusting insurance contracts and tax incentives (Kunreuther et al. 2010).
An interesting experiment providing information about how to improve risk communica-
tion is Wakker et al. (2007) providing experimental data on the effect of statistical information
on risk and ambiguity attitudes and on rational insurance decisions. From a policy perspec-
tive they recommend that in order to maximize the number of insurances taken, providing
particularly individual cost information can increase adoption of insurance products. The
first theoretical analysis using behavioral economics of the role of insurance in response
to climate change risks is by Botzen and van den Bergh (2009). They take into account
alternative theories of individual decision-making under uncertainty, namely Prospect and
rank-dependent utility, to investigate whether there is a potential for a private market for
natural disasters. This has important implications for climate policy as no insurance against
natural hazards such as floods is currently available in the Netherlands, even though insurance
might be a useful instrument to promote adaptation to increased flood risk. They test whether
individuals are willing to pay for private insurance and estimate risk premiums for flood
insurance under different climate change scenarios. This leads to higher WTP values than
under expected utility theory assumptions. As a result, a private insurance market for floods
in the Netherlands turns out to be feasible. Overall, making more realistic assumptions about
individual behavior and decision-making can increase the relevance of insights for policy
makers as well as for insurance companies.
Patt and Schröter (2008) examined decisions by farmers and policy makers to implement
and adopt measures against the risk of flooding. Using quantitative and qualitative data, they
found that farmers exhibit a status quo bias. This means that any adaptation action taken
is likely to be avoided because decision and adaptation behavior is influenced by certain
heuristics. Also policy makers were found to judge the seriousness and likelihood of climate-
related events as greater than farmers living in the affected area. This difference in the risk
perception of the two groups can be due to the use of mental shortcuts, as represented by
the availability or representativeness heuristics (see also Marx et al. 2007). Grothmann and
Patt (2005) include risk perception and perceived adaptive capacity as important cognitive
constraints in studying adaptation decisions. For example, they find that individual risk per-
ception of farmers deviates from objectively assessed risk which is in line with probability
weighting theory. This means that they underweight large and overweight small probabilities.
As a result, individual decision-making subject to such cognitive bias does not lead to optimal
adaptation decisions. This in turn means that policies are enforced inadequately and can fall
short of their intended goals. One solution suggested is to involve people not only in the pro-
cess of implementing climate adaptation policies but also in designing them. In other words,
a participatory mechanism might contribute to policy success. In addition, a broader model of
human decision making by these authors suggests that policy makers remove any cognitive
barriers to adaptation, for example, through better risk communication to improve adaptive
capacity. The complete list of cognitive factors hampering human rationality (Table 1) and
leading to decision biases indicates a large set of factors affecting adaptation decisions and
adaptative capacity. More research is needed to assess the magnitude of the various biases in
order to design adequate (effective and efficient) policies.
Others have focused on explaining the psychological aspects of mitigation behavior, i.e.
a reduction of greenhouse gases. Lange and Treich (2008) present a theoretical framework
illustrating some implications for climate policy of in particular ambiguity on individual deci-
sions making. While the majority of studies find that ambiguity reduces mitigation efforts,
they show that ambiguity might lead to stricter abatement policies. Ambiguity is relevant to
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climate policy as experts disagree in their predictions of future climatic change and potential
damage (although the large majority, united in IPCC, agrees about broad strokes of climate
change). The authors assume an ambiguity-averse decision maker who deviates from the
assumption of expected utility maximization and show that ambiguity aversion can cause
decision makers to react to uncertainties regarding future damages by reducing emissions.
Other insights come from studies analyzing effective communication of ambiguity, for exam-
ple, on the basis of IPCC reports on the state of climate science to inform the international
policy process. In this context, Karp (2005) recommend to incorporate definitive quantitative
evidence if available while Risbey and Kandlikar (2007) suggest reducing linguistic sources
of ambiguity. Notice that IPCC is very careful in its use of language related to uncertainty,
such as “likely”, “very likely”, “more likely than not”, “likely in some regions”, etc.
Some studies have examined cognitive factors, including knowledge and feelings and
their importance for public support concerning the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
O’Connor et al. (2002) find that individuals who can more accurately identify the causes
of climate change and who expect bad consequences from climate change are more likely
to undertake voluntary actions and to support stringent government policy. Furthermore,
cognitive variables such as knowledge of the causes of climate change better explain mitiga-
tion decisions like the purchase of energy-efficient appliances than economic variables do.
Lorenzoni et al. (2007) study psychological barriers to behavioural change in the context
of adopting alternative energy options. They find that a number of cognitive barriers hinder
individual responses to climate change, including habitual use of cars, lack of knowledge,
scepticism as a response to uncertainty, distrust in information sources, externalisation of
responsibility (blaming others), and pressure of social norms. Similar to what was found for
the adaptation literature, these results highlight the necessity for policy to manage and use
communication mechanisms more effectively. One suggestion from this study is to better
meet the need for basic information in a (more) credible and transparent way. This may
include using social marketing techniques to create awareness, acceptance and norms in
respect of climate change action among social groups and their networks. More credible
communication can also be realized through conveying climate change solutions more per-
sonally, that is, by emphasizing and reinforcing the connection between personal action and
impact on the climate. Education in schools, books and newspaper can play a major role in
facilitating a social change by creating appropriate knowledge and norms. In addition, inter-
ventions can be designed to interrupt habitual behaviours and to encourage consideration of
green alternatives (e.g., stimulating public transport).
The discussion in Sect. 5.1 about framing and how policy makers, researchers and the
public differently frame and interpret climate change problems and how this in turn affects
individual mitigation decision is explored by Yarnal et al. (2003). They did a survey where
global warming was once framed in terms of the local impacts and once in terms of the
national impacts of taking mitigation measures. Respondents’ willingness to support gov-
ernment policies turned out to be significantly different between these two frames, and also
the level at which they are willing to take voluntary action differs. Different frames can
lead to different responses from individuals. This has implication for the use of local and
national scenarios for communicating climate change. In particular, there seems to be an
added value of downscaling mitigation scenarios to local measures and strategies. In other
words, translating and framing climate change as a local issue can enable the public to work
with this problem in a local context. Framing it as a national or global issue, the dominant
approach right now, may make it more difficult for individuals to understand why climate
change may be relevant for them personally or for their local community or city. Against
this background, the campaign Cities for Climate Protection (CCPC) (Lindseth 2004) which
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has taken the local level as the relevant geographical space for climate protection may be an
effective approach to organize responses to climate change. Not only spatial but also other
frames such as those relating to time dimensions may affect responses to climate change.
Time framing means that information about weather and climate (change) can be provided
on a daily, weekly or monthly basis. The time factor may be especially relevant for responses
by farmers and insurancers.
The question how people trade off the cost and benefits of future consumption is of crucial
importance to long-run environmental problems like climate change. Environmental conser-
vation is determined by time preferences, i.e. preferences for current versus future states.
Behavioral economics suggests hyperbolic discounting, implying that future cost and bene-
fits receive greater weight than under the traditional assumption of exponential discounting.
This generally results in a stronger support for stringent, safe climate policy and project
choices more in line with long-run sustainability. Hyperbolic discounting in relation to cli-
mate change has been discussed by Arrow et al. (1996); Dasgupta et al. (1999); Howarth
(2003); Settle and Shogren (2004); Karp (2005), and Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008).
Climate protection can be regarded as a large-scale social dilemma, as it involves a global
public good (the atmosphere or climate conditions). The study of climate negations and vol-
untary cooperation therefore involve features of public goods as well. However, much of
this research excludes other-regarding preferences, including fairness, reciprocity and social
approval, and instead assumes self-interested motives only. Especially the interaction of par-
ticular risks and social preferences has been neglected. A rare experimental study of this
interaction is Hill and Buss (2010). They find that positional and status concerns can reverse
the well documented certainty effect. In other words, concerns for relative positions can lead
to increased risk taking. This insight highlights the relevance of the connection between social
preferences and preferences for risk where social comparison may stimulate risky behavior.
Other experimental research has found that agents in climate negotiations hold social pref-
erences. Dannenberg et al. (2007) used data from interviews with policy makers to find that
they have a strong equity preference in climate negotiations, which can explain cooperative
behavior observed in international climate negotiations. Lange and Vogt (2003), in a game
theoretical approach, argue that fairness orientations, i.e. preferences for equity, can serve
as an explanation for countries signing environmental agreements. The strength of social
preferences can be important for the design of incentives and institutional institutions for
negotiations (see, Fehr and Falk 2002 analyzing principle-agent relationships). For instance,
the desire to reciprocate or gain social approval through voluntary actions in the context of
climate negotiations should be recognized and perhaps stimulated. Alpizar et al. (2009) using
a framed field experiment study the effect of risk and ambiguity on farmers’ willingness to
cooperate when adapting to climate change. It was found that in particular communication
improved coordination under ambiguous conditions and lead to reduced adaptation costs.
In addition, material incentives, social rewards and punishment might be an option for
increasing cooperative behavior. Indeed, price based instruments such as emission trading
may not work effectively when other than price factors influence market behavior. Exper-
iments discussed in Sect. 2.2 show that cooperation can be established if a punishment
opportunity, such as an incentive in form of social disapproval, exists. Besides material pun-
ishment, social disapproval can lead to more cooperative outcomes compared to situations
with incentives that are due to formal regulatory policy. Thus, in order to improve the effec-
tiveness of a bargaining system Brekke and Johansson-Stenman (2008) suggest introducing
an institutional structure involving punishment and sanctioning mechanisms to leverage rec-
iprocity norms and cooperation. This will benefit the equity outcomes of negotiations and
improve the effectiveness of a bargaining system.
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The existence of other-regarding preferences is not only relevant to climate agreement
negotiations but also in the context of individual emission reduction through more strin-
gent climate policy in areas like transport, energy and consumption. The reason is that
other-regarding preferences, like social norms, intrinsic motivation, and altruism, can lead to
voluntary environmentally responsible behavior (see also Sect. 5.2). Rauscher (2006) presents
a theoretical model analyzing the effect of imposing an emission tax on voluntary cooperative
behavior. He finds that behavior motivated by social motives and intrinsic motivation may
be undermined by the implementation of a standard policy instrument originally designed
to affect self-interested individuals. This is in line with the wider literature on regulatory
policy crowding-out intrinsic motivations. Clearly, the introduction of a regulatory tax may,
overall, reduce voluntary abatement efforts and, in the worst case, even lead to an increase
in emissions.
Two examples of non-pecuniary incentives having a significant impact on behavior and
climate protection relate to status and social norms. Recent experimental research shows that
potential gains from social reputation act as a strong incentive for investing in climate pro-
tection measures. It is found that individual investments in climate protection are highest if
subjects are aware that their investment decision is made public, hence giving room to social
reputation effects (Milinski et al. 2006). In the context of climate policy, effective public
disclosure mechanisms can take the form of publicizing GHG emissions and people’s energy
usage or placing stickers on environmentally pollutive cars (Rand and Nowak 2009). An
empirical example comes from the City of Austin, which during a period of drought decided
to publicize information about the highest water use by private homes. This form of public
disclosure substantially decreased water consumption (McKinely 2008).
Reputation effects can also be important for the purchase of green products. Griskevicius
et al. (2010) argue that buying a green product may enable an individual to signal pro-social
behavior to others. Activating status or self-image concerns might therefore lead people to
engage in “conspicuous conservation”. This hypothesis was examined in an experimental
study that analyzed the influence of status on the choice of non-green and green products.
In view of this, green products might be advertised in a way that links them to status attri-
butes. For instance, the visibility of status-enhancing acts can be promoted by using badges,
signs or tags so that individuals can display their pro-social acts. An experimental study by
Alpizar et al. (2005) estimated the degree of positionality for a range of goods finding that
even insurances are prone to relative concerns and positional effects. For climate adaptation
this could mean that marketing of insurances through activating status might be an effective
strategy to increase adoption of insurances and self-protection.
Another powerful driver of human action is social norms and social pressure. Research in
social psychology by Cialdini (2003, 2007) suggest that communication employing social-
norm based appeals to elicit pro-environmental behavior can sometimes be superior to tradi-
tional mechanisms such as price changes, probably within limits. Their argument is that social
influence aimed at complying with social norms leads to two distinct benefits: maintenance
of social relationships and of a favourable self-image. Behavior by others can be a strong
personal motivation to spur compliance with environmental responsible behaviour. There-
fore, social cognitive factors deserve greater attention in environmental policy design. For
example, Ayres et al. (2009) illustrate that peer pressure can be successfully used to promote
energy conservation. Using field experiments they show that if individual behavior is com-
pared with conservation practices of neighbours, people can be persuaded to reduce emissions
and energy consumption. It is found that those who are provided with information about the
energy conservation of their neighbours are more likely to conserve energy themselves. They
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suggest that mechanisms like peer comparison and feedback, benchmarking, and ranking can
contribute to stimulating socially desirable behavior.
Nannen and van den Bergh (2010) is a rare study which combines behavioral econom-
ics (bounded rationality and relative welfare) and evolutionary or population interactions
between individuals in order to study climate policies affecting the choice between invest-
ment in fossil fuel and renewable energy technologies. As discussed in the previous section,
this model employs two new types of instruments, namely “prizes” and “advertisement”,
which are compared in performance with traditional environmental externality taxes. The
new instruments have the advantage that they stimulate the spread of information and net-
work formation in a world characterized by imperfect information and bounded rationality.
Similarly, Schwarz and Ernst (2009) combine empirical data with agent-based modeling
in studying the diffusion of water-saving innovations in Germany. Besides recommending
strong regulations for the adoption of such innovations, they suggest that information cam-
paigns using different types of public information channels can support the diffusion of such
sustainable innovations. Hence, communication strategies influencing social networks may
be a complementary policy strategy to diffuse innovations.
Policy lessons from the happiness literature suggest that, as a result of an income threshold
above which happiness is at best weakly correlated with income (Easterlin 1974), stringent
climate change policies in developed countries might not have the intended strong, nega-
tive effects on individual well-being as predicted by standard economics (Sekulova and van
den Bergh 2010). This threshold effect is due to basic needs being satisfied, the presence
of relative welfare effects, and people’s tendency to adapt to changing circumstances. The
latter would mean that individuals are capable of adapting to new circumstances and after
a brief transition period will approximate or restore their original well-being level (Cohen
and Vandenbergh 2008). However, this will not occur with regard to all changes. Especially
extreme climate change may affect feelings of security and basic needs of people, notably
in developing countries, which is likely to negatively affect well-being. All in all, happiness
research seems to suggest a more stringent, precautionary climate policy than traditional
economics informed by classical cost-benefit analysis (van den Bergh 2010).
Based on the results and arguments in this section, we suggest to adapt and comple-
ment regulatory climate policy in three ways: (1) ameliorate decision biases or errors relat-
ing to decisions under uncertainty, risk and ambiguity, common to the context of climate
change, through corrective policy; (2) develop non-pecuniary strategies to trigger social
preferences and include social context aspects in communication strategies to encourage
pro-environmental behavior; (3) be aware of geographical and temporal framing effects in
designing policies and communicating information.
6 Conclusions
Standard economic theory assumes that individuals are fully rational and act in a
self-interested manner. This has provided a very clear perspective on what efficient and effec-
tive environmental policy entails. Evidence from psychology and economics has enhanced
our understanding of how people behave and make certain decisions. It turns out that
observed behavior, notably in experiments, deviates from rational behavior or at least chal-
lenges its strong assumptions. In response, behavioral economics has developed alternative
explanations for, and theories of, economic behavior. In particular, bounded rationality and
other-regarding preferences are psychological regularities which alter the design of effective
and efficient policy. This research stresses the relevance of behavioral anomalies and social
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motivations affecting individual decision-making in a wide range of environmental contexts
ranging from energy decisions by households to negotiations for an international climate
agreement. By assuming a more realistic picture of individual behavior, behavioral econom-
ics makes it possible to draw robust environmental policy conclusions under conditions of
bounded rationality and other-regarding preferences.
Boundedly rational agents are unable to make optimal decisions, which has implications
for many aspects of environmental policy design. This covers a wide variety of issues, such
as the effectiveness and efficiency of environmental regulation including the use of economic
(market-based) instruments, the consistency of sovereignty of preferences and paternalistic
policy with long-run sustainability, specific policy framing to improve policy success, and
recognizing adaptation (in well-being terms) to changed circumstances like higher energy
prices. An important finding of behavioral environmental policy analysis is that policy should
go beyond price-based regulation or market-based instruments; that is, it should not place
its trust only in price signals—without denying that the latter are an essential part of many
good, effective policies. From an environmental welfare perspective, more competition in
retail markets might not be enough to encourage a behavioral change towards a sustainable
transition, such as the large-scale application of green alternatives (e.g., renewable energy
technologies) but rather requires additional polices. For example, presenting green alterna-
tives as the default option for consumers, lowering information costs (deliberation, infor-
mation, marketing campaigns, and education) and increasing taxation on status and habitual
goods with high environmental impacts can have a positive effect on sustainable consumption
behavior. This holds true for environmental polices seeking to stimulate behavioral change in
everyday, habitual activities with environmental significance. For example, using higher fuel
prices in an attempt to change transport behavior might not be enough to break bad habits or
even to establish and create pro-environmental habits. The formation of good habits may be
encouraged by monetary incentives, but, if intrinsic motivations are strong, such incentives
can be counterproductive. Even though some policies of this kind may be seen as inconsis-
tent with respecting consumer sovereignty, they seem legitimate if consumer preferences are
inconsistent with long-run sustainability. Indeed, in other areas like public health (smoking,
sexual behavior, driving behavior), consumer preferences are not taken for granted as public
policies are aimed precisely at changing them.
The review suggests that not all economic decisions can be reduced to self-interested
consumer choice. Economic psychology supports the existence of social norms contribut-
ing to voluntary environmental behavior, i.e. consumers’ pro-environmental behavior being
founded in altruistic preferences, moral motivation, social duty orientations and other social
preferences. Empirical evidence indicates that consumers are sufficiently altruistic (pure or
impure altruism), care about the expectations of others (status and conformity) and hold gen-
eral concerns about their social responsibility. Policy strategies can include the stimulation
of social preferences, for example, to foster voluntary environmental action and agreements.
Effective policies to address these situations include social rewards and punishment mech-
anism, such as the activation of citizen duty through social punishment (social stigma),
and information channels including the media, marketing campaigns and education, through
which social norms can be mediated and linked to a variety of environmental externality
problems. This may have implications for equity preferences and international environmen-
tal agreements. In particular, social punishment and reward mechanisms put in place can
improve the effectiveness of international climate policy negotiations.
As the purchase of “green goods” is strongly connected to self-identity concerns, mean-
ing that commodities may serve to communicate or reinforce one’s self-image to others,
the revelation of identity and information about the behavior or expectations of others
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(conformity) may have some impact on “green consumer behavior”. The mechanism behind
these norms is not fully understood and there is more to learn concerning the formation and
stability of voluntary environmental preferences based on social norms in order to inform
environmental policy.
Next, an important finding of norms and rules in social dilemma situations is that exter-
nally imposed, formal regulation can reduce or completely destroy informative, voluntary
and often evolved cooperative behavior, notably in common-pool resource situations. Such
regulatory policies may then perform poorly or even become counterproductive. The reason
is that such policies do not take into account social interactions that influence an agent’s
behavior. Indeed, much can be gained by activating social motives like fairness, reciprocity
or moral duty in support of cooperation. Policy can be linked to stimulation or activation
of norms through trust, communication, social interaction and contribute to the formation
of preferences supporting cooperation. For instance, the stimulation of reciprocal behavior
can increase donations to public goods. Linking policy to a variety of social, non-selfish and
other-regarding preferences can “crowd-in” and stabilize rather than “crowd-out” voluntary
environmental behavior. Other policy strategies involving social interactions between indi-
viduals include more intense self-regulation (informal rules) due to reciprocity and repeated
interactions and the support of participatory mechanism in the design of adaptation strategies
to climate change. Not only the presence of these sentiments but also the incongruence of
social preferences with existing institutional structures like property rights needs to receive
attention in policy design. This also serves as an explanation for the existence of many
environmental conflicts around the world, whereas traditional economic theory suggests that
Coasean solutions in the negotiation between polluter and victim would be more common.
A final conclusion is that behavioral theories have important implications for climate pol-
icy. Decisions relevant to climate change are made under conditions of uncertainty where
cognitive and psychological constraints influence individual risk judgments about the prob-
ability of outcomes and extreme events. Incorporating more realistic assumptions based on
evidence that individual decisions on particularly adaptation measures rely on heuristics can
improve the design of incentives and institutions, such as those promoting natural hazard
insurance. Other policy recommendations are the implementation of effective risk commu-
nication practices and participatory mechanisms in order to improve the decision-making
capacity of individuals and organizations regarding appropriate adaptation measures. Like
cognitive issues, other-regarding preferences and social norms affecting environmental deci-
sion-making have been sporadically addressed in the analysis of climate policy. Only a
few studies have considered these issues in the context of climate negotiations. Institutional
arrangements accounting for behavioral and social features of individuals are necessary
to overcome large scale collective action problems such as climate change. Our proposal
is that regulatory climate policy includes corrections to ameliorate decision biases relat-
ing to decisions under uncertainty, is extended with non-pecuniary strategies to encourage
pro-environmental behavior and accounts for geographical and temporal framing effects in
communicating information about policies.
7 Potential Research Avenues
The recent import of insights from behavioral economics into environmental economics
means that there are still many unresolved issues. We therefore end this paper by listing
some suggestions for further research.
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Research on sustainable consumption and pro-environmental behavior needs to address
the question which combination of pecuniary and non-pecuniary instruments works
most effectively in terms of reducing environmental impact of household and individ-
ual behavior. In designing and evaluating the effectiveness of non-pecuniary policy strat-
egies aimed at communicating the individual and social benefits of pro-environmen-
tal behavior, it may be useful to examine what can be learned from social marketing
approaches which can stimulate reputation effects in social networks to create respon-
sible environmental behavior. In addition, experiments with an explicit environmental
setting can be aimed at examining the impact and effectiveness of a variety of incen-
tives—working through reputation, approval and fear—on people’s willingness to behave
pro-environmentally, choose green products or invest in adaptation to climate change.
The assessment of policy effectiveness should further take into account potential (energy
or environmental) rebound effects, which possibly may arise when attention in pol-
icy shifts from regulation to information provision and moral suasion. The outcome of
such considerations may improve our insight on the right balance between the various
instruments.
Efficiency has been the dominant criterion for evaluation and comparison of pol-
icy instruments in environmental economics. Since social efficiency (or more limitedly,
cost-effectiveness) depends on individual efficiency, which is lower in the case of bounded
rationality, the efficiency evaluation of policy needs possibly to be adapted or at least done
with more care for cases where bounded rationality matters. Taking a broader perspective,
Table 3 provided a qualitative assessment of the consequences of the various classes of
behavioral features identified in Sect. 2 on core policy criteria, including also equity. Further
research is needed to arrive at a more definite judgment on this.
Another potential research avenue is the role of status-seeking behavior in the consump-
tion of goods and services with a relatively high contribution to environmental pressure.
Somewhat related is the role of (social) marketing in stimulating such consumption, and how
potentially misleading information can be controlled or countered with beneficial impacts in
terms of both reducing environmental pressure and improving individual well-being. This
is the negative side of status-seeking. On the other hand, status feelings might be employed
to stimulate the adoption of cleaner products and services, such as hybrid cars. Research on
this is lacking.
Regarding the link between monetary valuation and policy, it is relevant to under-
stand what bounded rationality means for biases in valuation of environmental external-
ities, and in turn for the formulation of externality regulation through (optimal) charges
or levies, as well as for the formulation of monitoring-and-control through the setting
of fine levels. At least we should try to get a general idea about whether biases are
upward or downward under certain conditions or for specific types of environmental
problems.
Many of the general policy insights can be immediately transferred to climate change,
while the latter also provides specific problems and instances of behavioral issues and
in turn specific problems for the design of climate policy. The impact of ambiguity of
climate change and its consequences evidently needs more research and some of it is
already underway. The role of bounded rationality in the formation of international cli-
mate agreements might receive more attention, to arrive at realistic views on the limits
and opportunities for agreement-making. Another relevant topic is the impact of social
context and information about low-probability/high-impact scenarios on adaptation deci-
sions, such as the purchase of insurances, which has received only sporadic attention so
far.
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